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 1 
CULTURAL ACCOMMODATION AND THE IDEA OF TRANSLATION 
UWE VAGELPOHL 
University of Warwick 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In a previous paper,1 I tried to establish whether there was an identifiable and 
consistent body of theories or ideas about translation to be found in the writings of 
producers and recipients of Arabic translations. My verdict was largely negative: 
while a number of translators, chiefly Ḥunayn b. Isḥāq, left us a body of scattered 
remarks about specific translation problems and their attitudes to their work, the 
material was insufficient to identify full-fledged “theories of translation.” Also, the 
arguments of contemporary scholars who disputed the possibility and value of 
translations and the philosophical and scientific knowledge they transmitted, while 
occasionally brilliant, only touched on specific aspects of the task of translation 
without developing a coherent theory of language or translation to support their 
criticism. Rather, what emerges from these sources is a series of criteria of 
translation, i.e. ideas about the nature of the translator’s task and the 
characteristics of a successful translation (as opposed to a suboptimal or failed one). 
The findings of this paper suggested that we need to take these criteria of 
translation, particular those of the translators themselves, into account when 
assessing their work and tracing the influence of particular translations on the 
                                                
1 U. Vagelpohl, “The ʿAbbasid Translation Movement in Context. Contemporary 
Voices on Translation,” in: ʿAbbasid Studies II. Occasional Papers of the School of ʿAbbasid 
Studies. Leuven, 28 June-1 July, 2004 (Orientalia Lovaniensia Analecta, 177), ed. J. Nawas, 
Leuven: Peeters, forthcoming, pp. 245-267. 
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Arabic philosophical and scientific traditions. Translations need to be measured 
against criteria applied by contemporary observers as far as they can be recovered 
through their own writings or are implicit in the characteristics of translations 
themselves. Since they often differ from our understanding of the task of 
translation, value judgments about the quality of Greek-Arabic translations 
inherent in categories such as ‘literal’ versus ‘free’ or diagnoses of ‘mistranslations’ 
according to modern translation standards are unhelpful.2  
I want to extend this discussion by asking the following question: what 
happens when a translator encounters a term, a phrase or an idea that he, for 
various reasons, is unable to translate? The answer to this question touches on a 
number of extremely important theoretical issues in translation studies and, like 
the question of an overarching concept of translation described above, helps us 
understand individual translations and the impact texts and ideas had on the 
development of Arabic science and philosophy. 
                                                
2 On this point, cf. also R. Evans, “Translating Past Cultures?,” in: The Medieval 
Translator 4, ed. R. Ellis and R. Evans, Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 1994, pp. 20-
45 (pp. 25-27). P. St-Pierre maintains that translation consists of a relation between 
three elements: a source, a translation and a set of translation criteria. Hence, 
translation is by necessity historical: “the criteria used by translators to produce 
their translations are … at once a limited and fairly stable set as well as contextually 
and historically defined”: P. St-Pierre, “The Historical Nature of Translation,” in: 
Translation Theory in Scandinavia, ed. P. Chaffey et al., Oslo: University of Oslo Press, 
1990, pp. 254-263 (p. 255). 
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Each translator was faced with a set of challenges determined (among others) by 
his training, background knowledge and experience and the character and quality 
of his source text(s).3 In spite of the highly specific nature of each such ‘translation 
situation,’ there are a number of typical problems that arose again and again. They 
raise the question of what I would like to term ‘translatability’:4 
 
1. the translator does not understand a term, phrase or idea; 
2. the translator understands but feels constrained by political and/or religious 
sensibilities; 
3. the translator understands but there is no target-language equivalent to 
convey a notion to his audience. 
 
Even the most competent Greek-(Syriac)-Arabic translator was never entirely 
immune to the first kind of problem. Any number of factors could get in the way of 
a full understanding of a source text, ranging from a translator’s qualifications and 
simple slips of the pen to problems outside his control such as deficient 
manuscripts. In addition, the transmission history of a translation sometimes 
                                                
3 E.g. the complexity of the subject matter or an author’s language but also material 
factors such as the condition of manuscripts. 
4 Understood literally as the ability or potential to be translated. The ‘translatability’ 
issues treated here are separate from other problems that are frequently discussed 
under the same label, e.g. the often intimate relationship between the form and 
contents of a text. Cf. e.g. H.-J. Störig, Das Problem des Übersetzens (Wege der Forschung, 
3), Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 19732, p. xxi-xxii. 
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complicated matters through scribal mistakes, glosses that were absorbed into a 
text or the interventions of well-meaning scribes and readers. Generally, such 
problems have little explanatory value for the mechanism of translation itself, i.e. 
the series of decisions through which a translator transitions from source to target 
text. Also, until we have a better grasp of the history of the Greek-Arabic translation 
movement and the influence of its transmitters and audiences on a text in the 
course of its transmission, the distinction between problems caused by translation 
and those arising in the course of the transmission process will remain problematic. 
It is the remaining translation problems which interest me. They illustrate 
general phenomena of translation and reception history and the interaction 
between texts and their audience and illustrate the serious methodological 
challenges facing translators. The last item in particular, the lack of a target-
language or even target-culture equivalent, affects a wide a variety of texts but has 
often been relegated (without further explanation) to the large and amorphous 
category of ‘mistranslations.’ Below, I would like to present a set of examples for 
this important phenomenon and try to describe it in terms of wider issues affecting 
translation into any language. 
The translation and reception history of philosophical texts in Arabic pose 
an equally, if not more interesting question that is directly related to the problem 
described above: what does ‘translatability’ mean for the reception of a text, i.e. 
what happens once problematic translations become part of literary traditions, are 
read and commented on? In addition to an analysis of a translated text, I will 
attempt to trace examples for such ‘problematic’ translations and determine their 
influence on the subsequent philosophical tradition. 
 5 
The examples discussed below are drawn from two sources: the Arabic 
translation of Aristotle’s Rhetoric and Ibn Rushd’s (d. 595/1198) so-called “Middle 
Commentary,”5 the last in a long line of Arabic commentaries on the Rhetoric. Ibn 
Rushd’s understanding of the text is informed by the philological and philosophical 
efforts of generations of scholars, most prominently al-Fārābī (d. 339/950)6 and Ibn 
Sīnā (d. 429/1037).7 At the same time, he attempts to strip the Rhetoric of some of the 
                                                
5 Thanks to its subject matter and its long transmission and commentary history, 
the Arabic Rhetoric contains a wealth of material with which to illustrate translation 
problems and their influence on the reception of a text. Also, since it belongs to an 
earlier stratum of the Greek-Arabic translation movement, it functions as 
something of a ‘translation laboratory’ in which the translator tested a range of 
solutions to what he himself clearly perceived as substantial problems. 
6 E.g. his Kitāb al-Khaṭāba (Book of Rhetoric) and the Latin remains of a long 
commentary known as Didascalia in Rhetoricam Aristotilis ex Alpharabii glosa, both 
edited by J. Langhade and M. Grignaschi, Al-Fārābī. Deux ouvrages inédits sur la 
Rhétorique (Recherches publiées sous la direction de l’Institut des lettres orientales de 
Beyrouth, première série: Pensée Arabe et Musulmane, 48), Beirut: Dār al-Mashriq, 1971. 
7 Especially the relevant parts of his al-Ḥikma al-ʿarūḍiyya (Philosophy for al-ʿArūḍī; 
the two key chapters were edited by Muḥammad Salīm Sālim: Ibn Sīnā, Kitāb al-
Majmūʿ aw al-ḥikma al-ʿarūḍiyya fī maʿānī Kitāb Rīṭūrīqā, Cairo: Maktabat al-Nahḍa al-
Miṣriyya, 1945 and D. Remondon, al-Akhlāq wa-l-Infiʿālāt al-Nafsānīya, in: Mémorial 
Avicenne, 4, Cairo: Publications de l'Institut Français d’Archéologie Orientale du 
Caire, 1954, pp. 19-29) and his monumental Kitāb al-Shifāʾ (The Cure; the book on 
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philosophical accretions of previous centuries and recover what he regarded as the 
authentic thought of Aristotle. His commentary gives us a panoramic view of the 
preceding commentary tradition and also a good idea as to how one (albeit 
particularly qualified) reader understood the translation, because this is what he 
comments on: not the elusive Aristotelian ‘original,’ to which he did not have 
access, but the Arabic Rhetoric, the Rhetoric passed through the filter of translation. 
Often enough, the two are not the same. 
The Islamic philosophical tradition operated with several different types of 
commentaries, many of them derived from the commentary practices of late 
antique Hellenism.8 They ranged from succinct abridgements to voluminous 
                                                                                                                                       
rhetoric was edited by Muḥammad Salīm Sālim: Ibn Sīnā, al-Shifāʾ. La Logique. 8. 
Rhétorique [al-Khaṭāba], Cairo: Imprimerie Nationale, 1954). 
8 The genealogy and sometimes complicated relations between commentary 
practices of Islamic philosophers are explained in detail in D. Gutas, “Aspects of 
Literary Form and Genre in Arabic Logical Works,” in: Glosses and Commentaries on 
Aristotelian Logical Texts: The Syriac, Arabic and Medieval Traditions (Warburg Institute 
Surveys and Texts), ed. Ch. Burnett, London: Warburg Institute, 1993, pp. 29-76. For a 
sketch of the commentary tradition on Aristotle’s Rhetoric, cf. M. Aouad, “La 
Rhétorique. Tradition syriaque et arabe,” in: Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques, ed. 
R. Goulet, I, Paris: Éditions du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1989, pp. 
455-472, together with M. Aouad, “La Rhétorique. Tradition syriaque et arabe 
(compléments),” in the 2003 Supplément to the Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques, 
pp. 219-233 and U. Vagelpohl, Aristotle’s Rhetoric in the East. The Syriac and Arabic 
 7 
lemmatized elaborations of the complete text of the original together with the 
commentator’s often lengthy discussions. Ibn Rushd’s works include commentaries 
of various types which sometimes overlap in character, length and purpose. Of his 
commentaries on the Rhetoric, two are extant: the Middle Commentary or mukhtaṣar 
and the Short Commentary or jawāmiʿ. The latter only covers a small part of the text 
of the Rhetoric and focuses on theoretical principles of rhetoric relevant to the wider 
field of logic. The Middle Commentary, on the other hand, is an extended 
paraphrase of the Aristotelian text following the sequence of the Rhetoric and 
expanding the text with frequent theoretical discussions and digressions.9 
In paraphrasing the Rhetoric in his Middle Commentary, Ibn Rushd’s 
intention was not simply to gloss the text and facilitate its comprehension; he 
wanted nothing less than to return to the original intention of Aristotle by 
concentrating on the sense of the text rather than its wording.10 In this respect, his 
                                                                                                                                       
Translation and Commentary Tradition (Islamic Philosophy, Theology and Science. Texts and 
Studies, 76), Leiden: Brill, 2008, pp. 181-204, esp. 197-200. 
9 M. Aouad, “Manāhij Ibn Rushd fī l-qawl fī l-aqāwīl al-khiṭābiyya wa-talkhīṣ al-
khiṭāba,” in: Ibn Rushd faylasūf al-sharq wa-l-gharb, ed. Miqdād ʿArafa Mansiyya, II, 
Tunis: Dār al-Gharb al-Islāmī, 1999, pp. 41-55 explains the different methods of 
commenting and the difference between the particular texts. 
10 Cf. M. Aouad, “Les fondéments de la Rhétorique d’Aristote reconsidérés par 
Averroès dans l’abrégé de la Rhétorique, ou le développement du concept de ‘point 
de vue immediate’,” in: Peripatetic Rhetoric after Aristotle (Rutgers University Studies in 
Classical Humanities, 6), ed. W. Fortenbaugh and D. Mirhady, New Brunswick: 
Transaction Publishers, 1994, pp. 261-313 (pp. 263-264). 
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method was less ‘radical’ than that applied by his most prominent predecessors, al-
Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā, who often either worked only on those sections of the Rhetoric 
that suited their purposes or read it through the lens of their own logical and 
ethical concerns.11 
In some respects, then, Ibn Rushd’s Middle Commentary on the Rhetoric 
represents the culmination of the philosophical commentary tradition. As such, it is 
highly interesting for our purposes: it illustrates particularly well how a widely read 
and experienced individual dealt with a text as problematic as the Arabic Rhetoric, 
including those issues we have filed under the label ‘translatability.’ 
 
‘TRANSPOSITION’: FROM VOICE TO MUSIC AND BACK 
Book Three of Aristotle’s Rhetoric discusses practical aspects of oratory such as the 
style and arrangement of speeches. In the first chapter, Aristotle introduces some of 
the important stylistic concepts he elaborates in the first half of the book. Among 
others, he touches on the subject of delivery and describes how an orator’s voice 
helps in influencing an audience. The passage I am interested in lists a number of 
                                                
11 On al-Fārābī and his emphasis on the relevance of rhetoric for the field of logic, cf. 
Langhade and Grignaschi, Deux ouvrages inédits, p. 26. Ibn Sīnā was interested both in 
the practical use of rhetoric and in its importance for logic; cf. Averroès (Ibn Rushd), 
Commentaire moyen à la Rhétorique d’Aristote, ed. M. Aouad, I, Paris: Librairie 
Philosophique J. Vrin, 2002, p. 6. 
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vocal qualities employed to elicit emotions, e.g. volume or intensity, rhythm and 
intonation.12 
 
The Arabic Rhetoric 
Aristotle starts by stressing the role of the voice in delivery. The first vocal 
characteristic he takes up is volume or intensity: whether the voice of the orator be 
loud, soft or in between. The corresponding Greek terms are rendered with their 
nearest Arabic equivalent, i.e. φωνή (voice) as ṣawt, qualified by the adjectives 
μεγάλη (loud), kubrā; μικρά (soft/quiet), ṣughrā; and μέση (intermediate), wusṭā. 
Both the Greek and Arabic terms are adjectives with a wide variety of 
meanings and match well with one slight exception: in the context of voice and 
vocal qualities, ʿulyā would have been a better match than kubrā. For the various 
forms of μέγας occurring throughout the Rhetoric, the translator modulates his 
terminology according to context and picks from a variety of Arabic equivalents 
such as ʿaẓīm, ḍakhm and ṭawīl. The somewhat unexpected grammatical form of the 
Arabic adjectives (elative instead of positive; feminine in spite of their linkage with 
ṣawt) remains puzzling. The translator either did not know that the adjectives refer 
to φωνή or, perhaps more likely, that he consciously chose the gender of the Greek 
                                                
12 The passage is relatively short, it runs from 1403b27-32 (corresponding to volume 
1, p. 172, ll. 8-14 in the Arabic translation: M. Lyons, Aristotle’s Ars Rhetorica: The 
Arabic Version, Cambridge: Pembroke Arabic Texts, 1982) and forms part of a wider 
discussion of oratorical delivery (ὑπόκρισις), translated as al-akhdh bi-l-wujūh (the 
taking of faces). I have discussed this strange expression in Vagelpohl, Aristotle’s 
Rhetoric, pp. 77-83; for my remarks on the passage in question, cf. pp. 84-88. 
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forms in spite of the fact that ṣawt is masculine. The question arises whether the 
translator understood the meaning intended here or played it safe and picked the 
most general meaning of the term. We will come back to this idea in a minute. 
A gloss in the Arabic manuscript on al-ṣughrā wa-l-wusṭā (the quiet and 
intermediate [sc. voice]) explains that kull hādhā min asmāʾ al-naghm fī l-mūsīqī, “all of 
these are terms for [kinds of] melodies in music.” As we will see, this note 
anticipates the following re-interpretation of the text through the terminology 
chosen by the translator. 
The next clause adds “pitch accent” or τόνος to the vocal qualities an orator 
should consciously employ to modulate his emotional appeal. The corresponding 
qualities are ὀξύς, βαρύς and, again, μέσος. The first of these terms means “intense,” 
“high” or, more specifically, “acute accent” or “rising pitch,” the second means 
“deep” or “with a falling pitch” or “grave accent.” The third again denotes an 
intermediate quality between the two or a “circumflex accent.” The system of pitch 
accent referred to in these lines does not correspond to any vocal category in Arabic 
or Syriac, a major problem for the translator. 
Owing to the deterioration of the (unique) Paris manuscript of the Arabic 
Rhetoric, the translation for the key term τόνος is very difficult to read. Lyons 
suggested al-hādiyāt, probably derived from the verb hadā, “to drive camels with 
song.”13 Badawī, a previous editor of the text,14 and Sālim, who compared the 
                                                
13 Cf. F. Shehadi, Philosophies of Music in Medieval Islam, Leiden: Brill, 1995, p. 60. He 
also makes the somewhat unlikely claim that it may be related to the term ḥudāʾ, the 
humming or singing to camels in the rhythm of the movement of the animals and 
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manuscript with the lemmata in Ibn Rushd’s Middle Commentary,15 proposed al-
hādimāt, “the destroying,” a reading that does not seem to make much sense. 
For the three types of pitch accent, the translator chose the translations al-
ḥādda, al-thaqīla and al-wusṭā. Although the first two of these terms may have some 
sort of musical connotation—al-ḥādd is the name of the last and highest string of the 
ʿūd and al-thaqīl occurs in the names of some rhythmic modes listed by al-Kindī16—
the connection to music seems tenuous enough to use the general, non-technical 
meaning of the words (e.g. “vivacious”, “serious” and “intermediate”) which make 
good sense in this context. 
The next vocal quality Aristotle introduced is ῥυθμός, the “measure” or 
“rhythm” of the voice. The translator rendered it with the phrase al-naghm aw al-
nabarāt. Both terms belong to the field of music. The former means “mode”, “voice” 
or “note,” the latter “intonation”, “cadence” or “interval.” The use of collocations in 
translation is a well-known translational strategy we frequently encounter in the 
Rhetoric but also in later, more sophisticated translations. It can serve two purposes: 
                                                                                                                                       
notes that this genre stands at the very beginning of the history of Arabic music 
(Shehadi, Philosophies, p. 5-6). 
14 Arisṭūṭālīs: al-Khiṭāba. Al-Tarjama al-ʿarabiyya al-qadīma (Dirāsāt Islāmiyya, 23), ed. 
ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Badawī, Cairo: Maktabat al-Nahḍa al-Miṣriyya, 1959. 
15 Talkhīṣ al-khaṭāba, ed. Muḥammad Salīm Sālim, Cairo: al-Majlis al-Aʿlā li-l-Shuʾūn 
al-Islāmiyya, Lajnat Iḥyāʾ al-Turāth al-Islāmī, 1967. 
16 Cf. A. Shiloah, Music in the World of Islam: A Socio-Cultural Study, Aldershot: Scholar 
Press, 1995, p. 111, 120 and H. Farmer, A History of Arabian Music to the XIIIth Century, 
London: Luzac & Co., 1929, p. 111. 
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to render a translation more precise by reproducing the semantic scope of a Greek 
term as fully as possible; or to mask the uncertainty of the translator about the 
exact meaning of a term by covering as much semantic ground as possible with two 
related Arabic terms.17 The case above probably falls into the second category; only 
one of the terms proposed, al-nabra, comes close to the meaning of ῥυθμός. 
Elsewhere in the Arabic Rhetoric, ῥυθμός is translated either with the single term 
nabra (7 times), twice with the collocations naghma aw nabra and once with nabra aw 
naghma. Conversely, throughout the text, both of these terms are exclusively used 
for ῥυθμός. 
While nabra/nabarāt also includes tonal qualities of the spoken voice, it 
seems (like naghma) more appropriate for describing song and singing voices. This 
association clearly was in the mind of the glossator of the manuscript when he 
added the note on al-ṣughrā wa-l-wusṭā mentioned above (kull hādhā min asmāʾ al-
naghm fī l-mūsīqā). The link is less pronounced in a further gloss on al-shayʾ min al-
naghm which reads: mithl al-raḥma wa-l-ghaḍab wa-ka-mā yarfaʿu-hu18 yakhfiḍu al-ṣawt 
wa-bi-ghaḍabi-hi yarfaʿu l-ṣawt wa-mā ashbaha dhālika.19 It might indicate that the 
glossator noticed the ambiguity between vocal qualities in music and spoken 
discourse introduced by the translator. However, if this was the same person who 
                                                
17 Cf. Vagelpohl, Aristotle’s Rhetoric, p. 143 with n. 171 and p. 147 with n. 175 (with 
further references). 
18 Lyons: bi-raḥma. 
19 “Such as compassion and anger just as it raises it [according to Lyons’ reading: ‘in 
compassion’] the voice is lowered and in anger the voice is raised and what is 
similar to that.” 
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added the first gloss above, he may have thought that the section continues to 
discuss singing voices. 
Concluding his short digression on the voice and its role in rhetoric, 
Aristotle again stressed the importance of these three vocal qualities in delivering 
public speeches in terms which are already familiar: μέγεθος  (volume), ἁρμονία 
(“harmony” or “change of pitch”) and ῥυθμός (rhythm). By translating μέγεθος with 
al-ʿiẓam (magnitude/power), the translator reproduced the most general meaning of 
the term. It has little if any musical connotations but would fit both a vocal and a 
musical context. The same applies to ἁρμονία, rendered as al-tawfīq 
(adaptation/mediation). The link between ἁρμονία and τόνος (the former denotes 
well-placed changes in τόνος) seems to be lost. For ῥυθμός, he picked al-nabra, one 
of the components of the expression he had used just two lines earlier for the same 
Greek term. 
This short passage exemplifies a range of strategies to deal with obvious 
cross-cultural translation issues. The translator identified the vocal and/or musical 
aspect of the discussion but tried at the same time to hedge his bets by picking 
terms that are very broad and correspond to the more general meaning of the Greek 
vocabulary rather than their narrowly musical or vocal connotations. Most likely, 
the translator did not fully understand the text at this point. He tried to retain as 
much of its sense as possible by opting for a generic translation covering the more 
general meanings of the Greek terms. At the same time, he adapted his translation 
by transposing a (poorly understood) discussion of vocal qualities onto the field of 
music, if only half-heartedly: many of the Arabic terms suggest that the translator 
wanted to keep his options as open as possible. 
 
 14 
Ibn Rushd 
Since Ibn Rushd’s procedure involved paraphrase rather than verbatim quotation of 
lemmata, it is not always easy to establish direct correspondences between 
particular terms. Also, the discussion of vocal qualities in the Middle Commentary is 
embedded in an argument about the passions of the soul and their role in rhetoric: 
the voice becomes one more instrument to arouse emotions and influence an 
audience. Keeping these limitations in mind, we can identify the following concepts 
Ibn Rushd picked from our passage and elaborated on: naghm, “intonation” and 
ḍarb, “rhythm.” The concepts of ἁρμονία and τόνος are either dropped or folded 
into the more general idea of naghm.20 
Concerning al-naghm, Ibn Rushd explains that it operates by “softening” 
(raqqaqa) or “raising” (ʿaẓẓama) the voice (ṣawt) to evoke emotions such as pity and 
anger. With some changes in terminology, this paragraph matches the beginning of 
the translation and reflects the vocal qualities associated with μέγεθος and perhaps 
also τόνος—instead of ῥυθμός, as in the Arabic Rhetoric.21 Ibn Rushd’s comment 
strongly resembles the marginal gloss in the Paris manuscript referred to above 
which also links the evocation of emotions such as pity and anger with the raising 
and lowering of the voice. 
“Rhythm” is introduced as another aspect of intonation necessary in speech-
making and immediately linked to poetry (in phrases such as ḍarb min al-wazn and 
                                                
20 Cf. Aouad, Commentaire moyen, II, p. 266 = par. 3.1.7-9. 
21 Aouad, Commentaire moyen, II, p. 266 = par. 3.1.7, commenting on Lyons, Aristotle’s 
Ars Rhetorica, vol. 1, p. 172, ll. 8-11. This corresponds to 1403b27-29. 
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awzān ashʿār etc.)22 Ibn Rushd explains this digression on poetry (which Aristotle 
does not mention at all) with its relevance in speeches: verses are useful to start or 
end speeches or to mark pauses.23 
Ibn Rushd seems to have had a better idea about the subject of this passage 
than the translator: while he, like the translator, did not (and most likely could not) 
pick up on the references to the Greek pitch accent system, he understood that the 
subject is the speaking voice and not music. Also, he correctly identified intonation 
and cadence or rhythm as the central vocal qualities discussed in this passage. His 
digression on poetry and its role in speech may have been motivated by his 
knowledge of Aristotelian poetics and triggered by the appearance of the term 
naghm; the term wazn links ḍarb and shiʿr. 
By streamlining the terminology, limiting the discussion to two central 
terms and inserting his remarks on vocal qualities into a wider discussion of the role 
and evocation of emotions in public speech, Ibn Rushd sidestepped some of the 
problems of the translation. Helped by the commentary tradition that had evolved 
over the preceding centuries, he arrived at an understanding of this passage that 
was at least in parts closer to the argument made by Aristotle than the more 
complete but sometimes misleading translation. Keeping in mind that the 
translation and secondary texts written on the basis of the translation were his only 
source, he was surprisingly successful in his “return to Aristotle.”24 
                                                
22 Aouad, Commentaire moyen, par. 3.1.8. 
23 Aouad, Commentaire moyen, par. 3.1.9. 
24 The “Rückwendung zu Aristoteles,” as G. Schoeler, “Averroes’ Rückwendung zu 
Aristoteles. Die ‘Kurzen’ und die ‘Mittleren Kommentare zum Organon’,” Bibliotheca 
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GENERALIZATION: GREEK COURTS AND THE ‘LEGALIZATION’ OF LOGIC 
The section of text discussed above is relatively short, consisting of little more than 
half a dozen lines. It illustrated two mechanisms to overcome a cross-cultural gap, 
the adaptation of a target language text by either generalization or transposition. 
The former attempts to preserve as much of a source as possible with target 
language terms that cover more general aspects of the source language vocabulary, 
either because the translator barely understood the text or encountered 
phenomena which had no parallel in the target culture and/or language. The latter 
transposes an argument into categories a target language audience could 
comprehend. It requires the translator to understand his source well enough to 
make an informed decision about the field or categories he wants to transpose it 
into. 
The next example is based on a larger text sample, the first and third 
chapters of Book One of the Rhetoric.25 In the first chapter, Aristotle outlined the 
relation between rhetoric and dialectics. He then criticized handbooks of rhetoric 
written by his predecessors and concluded with a discussion of the usefulness of 
rhetoric. In the third chapter, Aristotle distinguished between three types of public 
speeches and their respective subject matter. 
                                                                                                                                       
Orientalis 37 (1980): 294-301, calls the development in Ibn Rushd’s own thought away 
from an early reliance on al-Fārābī’s and Ibn Sīnā’s creative elaboration of 
Aristotelian ideas and toward a ‘purer’ Aristotelianism. 
25 Corresponding to 1354a1-1355b25 and 1358a36-1359a29 of the Greek text and p. 1-
5 and 16-18 of Lyon’s edition of the Arabic translation. 
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What I am mainly interested in are references to the Greek judicial system. 
Since judicial oratory (δικανικόν) is one of the three species of rhetoric described in 
the book, Aristotle frequently referred to legal offices and institutions he expected 
his readers to be familiar with. In a society largely regulated by Islamic law, the 
institutional framework described must have been strange, even incomprehensible, 
as were those of the other two types of public speech Aristotle discussed, 
συμβουλευτικόν (deliberative/political) and ἐπιδεικτικόν (“demonstrative” speech 
assigning praise or blame).26 
 
The Rhetoric 
With a handful of exceptions, Aristotle’s legal terminology in these chapters is 
derived from three word groups: firstly, δικάζω/δική, conveying the general notion 
of justice and its application; secondly, κρίνω/κρίσις, drawing distinctions and 
making decisions, both in a general and a legal sense; and thirdly, νομίζω/νόμος, 
acting according to or enforcing customs and laws. 
Among the terms from the first group, the verb δικάζω and its derivatives, 
particularly the middle participle δικαζόμενος, play a key role. Aristotle used the 
verb δικάζω in its strictly legal sense of “judging” or “speaking in a court.” The 
translator rendered its two occurrences as waḍaʿa l-ḥukm and al-ḥukūma 
(dispensation of justice). This term also occurs in a marginal gloss at the beginning 
                                                
26 Cf. Aristotle, Rhetorik (Aristoteles: Werke in deutscher Übersetzung, 4), ed. Ch. Rapp, II, 
Berlin: Akademie Verlag , pp. 257-258. 
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of the Rhetoric which explains al-rīṭūrīqā as balāgha fī l-ḥukūma, “eloquence in the 
dispensation of justice.”27 
The medium participle δικαζόμενος denotes the speaker in front of the 
court. Instead of ḥakama (to judge/decide) and its derivatives, the translation relies 
on forms of nāzaʿa and tashājara (to dispute/fight). They reflect the conflictual 
nature of the situation described by Aristotle but do not carry the strong legal 
connotations inherent in δικάζω and particularly in δικαζόμενος. In the neuter 
plural, the adjective δικανικός serves as the technical term for judicial oratory, one 
of the three oratorical genres around which the practical parts of Aristotle’s Rhetoric 
revolve. In the two chapters we are discussing, the translator rendered this central 
term as al-tashājur ([mutual] dispute/argument) or mushājirī (disputing), again 
emphasizing the adversarial nature of the exchange between two parties at the 
expense of its very specific legal meaning.28 He also missed the fact that the 
infinitive τὸ δικολογεῖν, which occurs once in our sample, was little more than a 
synonym for [τὰ] δικανικά. Unsure about its meaning, he coined the calque 
yanṭuqūn bi-l-ʿadl, “they pronounce justice.” 
The remaining terms of this group cover the institutional side of the Greek 
legal system. Δική can mean either the court of law itself or the trial or lawsuit 
taking place in front of it. In our sample, it was translated with the infinitives of the 
                                                
27 Lyons omits the note; it is mentioned in Aouad, Commentaire moyen, III, p. 1. See 
also his following discussion of the meaning of ḥukūma on pp. 1-2. 
28 Elsewhere in the Arabic Rhetoric, he also makes use of the terms khuṣūmī and al-
khuṣūma, “dispute” or “argument” or, more specifically, “lawsuit” which reproduce 
the legal flavor of δικανικός much better. 
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VI and III forms, al-tashājur and al-mushājara (dispute/argument), dropping the 
contextual distinction between legal institution and legal proceeding. The term 
δικαστής presents an interesting problem the translator may have been aware of: 
together with the term κριτής discussed below, it means judge—except in Athens, 
where it was used for members of the jury. Modern translations of the Rhetoric 
reflect this ambiguity, some opting for one meaning, some for the other. The 
translator largely respected the distinction Aristotle seemed to make; with a single 
exception, he translates δικαστής with fāḥiṣ, “investigator.” The root f-ḥ-ṣ expresses 
the notion of inspection and investigation and may be an intelligent attempt to 
reproduce aspects of the role of the jury in legal proceedings, but it is not a legal 
term. Its wider scope is illustrated by its use for ἐξετάζειν … λόγον (to test an 
opinion) in the first paragraph of chapter 1. This is another example for a 
translation that captures at least part of the general meaning of the Greek source 
term but sheds its more narrowly legal focus. 
Aristotle’s use of the second group of terms, those linked to the verb κρίνω, 
oscillates between its general (to distinguish/decide) and more specifically legal 
meaning (to decide [in legal matters] = to judge). The root ḥ-k-m, from which the 
translator took his terminology, covers both aspects. His translation for the verb 
κρίνω is ḥakama (to judge/decide), for the noun κρίσις ḥukm (ruling/decision) and 
for both the participle κρίνων and the noun κριτής the corresponding active 
participle ḥākim (ruler/judge). In the Greek and the Arabic, the context allows us to 
distinguish between the concrete legal meaning of κρίσις and κριτής and its general, 
metaphorical use for various forms of decision-making, including the “judgments” 
of political advisers and lawmakers concerning future events. 
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The vocabulary of the third group, mainly represented by νόμος and 
νομοθέτης, is remarkably uniform in both languages. Aristotle spoke of the “law” as 
the basis for judicial decisions and introduced the “lawmaker” as the person who 
judges on the merits of “deliberative” speeches and also creates the legal framework 
for judicial decisions. The translator’s choice of terms has an Islamic ring to it: the 
former is translated as al-sunna (norm/precedent) or the plural al-sunan, the latter 
with the related calque wāḍiʿ al-sunna (“one who establishes the norm”, i.e. a 
“lawgiver”?).29 In the same vein, he translated the isolated instances of the infinitive  
νομοθετεῖν and the noun νομοθεσία with the calque waḍʿ al-sunan, “establishment of 
the norms.” While alluding to its terminology, the translator did not seem have a 
transposition of Aristotle’s discussion into the world of Islamic law in mind; few, if 
any, of his other terminological decisions would fit such a scenario. 
Other important legal terms include κατηγορία (accusation) and ἀπολογία 
(defence). The former is rendered as shikāya (“complaint,” a broad notion that 
includes legal aspects), a term the translator also regularly used for forms of the 
verb κατηγορέω. The same verb is also translated several times with forms of the 
verb shakā (to complain).30 For ἀπολογία, the translator selected iʿtidhār (plead in 
                                                
29 Elsewhere, sunna also translates a few additional Greek terms derived from 
νόμος/νομίζω and, strangely, a term with strong religious, New Testament 
undertones, ἐπάγγελμα (promise). 
30 Outside of our sample, we also find the more general verbs dhamma 
(blame/criticize) and qarafa (loathe). The noun shikāya and the verb shakā also 
translate one instance each of δική and ἔγκλημα/ἐγκαλέω (blame/accuse), terms 
that are even more narrowly legal in their application than κατηγορία. 
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defence)31 which fits both legal and more general ‘argumentative’ contexts; forms of 
iʿtadhara also render the verb ἀπολογέομαι.32 
Aristotle called the parties variously accusing or defending themselves in a 
court of law ἀμφισβητοῦντες, a legal term for the opposing sides in litigation. The 
translator apparently attempted to elaborate on what exactly these parties did in 
front of the court, i.e. to demonstrate or establish the merits of their case. He first 
called them “the one who demonstrates or proves” (alladhī yurī aw yuthabbit), then 
alladhī yurī or alladhī yuthabbit, each time in the singular. In the final occurrence (of 
our sample), they are “those who dispute,” alladhīna yatashājarūn (plural at last), 
evoking the terminology he used to render δικαζόμενος and other terms derived 
from δικάζω.33 Finally, our sample contains a single example for straightforward 
transliteration of a Greek legal term: Ἄρειος πάγος was rendered as ahl aryūs fāghūs, 
“people of Aryūs Fāghūs.” 
Overall, it seems to be the case that the legal character of Aristotle’s remarks 
becomes substantially blurred in the process of translation. The translator 
understood that the discussion had something to do with legal matters and 
                                                
31 Also translated as ḥujja (plea/argument) in the remainder of the Arabic Rhetoric. 
32 In the rest of the Rhetoric, he variously used ajāba (reply/react) and two isolated 
instances each of radda (reply) and iḥtijāj (plea). Some of the Arabic terms listed 
above carry legal connotations, albeit less pronouncedly than Aristotle’s Greek. 
Other terms express little more than the general idea of arguing for or against a 
claim. 
33 The same root translates ἐπεξέρχομαι, also a legal term for charging someone with 
a crime. 
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correctly identified such legal categories for which there were straightforward 
equivalents such as ḥākim and sunna. On the other hand, there are specific legal 
categories without an equivalent in the Arabic language or Islamic culture such as 
ἀμφισβητοῦντες, δικαστής, δικαζομένος etc.; in such cases, he picked Arabic terms 
that reflect their more general (and less specifically legal) meaning. As a result, the 
concrete court scenario depicted by Aristotle becomes a generic process of debate 
and decision according to a framework created by a wāḍiʿ al-sunna.34 
The picture that emerges from the translation bears enough resemblance to 
legal proceedings to be understood as such (the glosses tell us as much), but is 
strangely removed from (and incompatible with) actual Islamic legal practice. It 
must have been obvious to the reader that Aristotle’s argument takes place in a 
world that was substantially different from his own. If we had more evidence to 
credit the translator with a satisfactory understanding of the text, we would have to 
commend him for his technique of stressing the ‘otherness’ of Aristotle’s scenario 
and, by implication, the inapplicability of Aristotelian legal oratory to a world 
regulated by Islamic law. However, it is much more likely that the translator simply 
lacked the necessary background knowledge—he had to resort to transcription to 
translate the name of the highest Athenian court, the Ἄρειος πάγος (ahl aryūs 
                                                
34 For final confirmation of my claim that the translation moves away from 
Aristotle’s predominantly legal terminology toward a more general frame of 
reference, it would be necessary also to compare the vocabulary of the translation 
to the technical terminology of other legal areas, e.g. that of maẓālim courts which 
were administered by state authorities instead of the Islamic legal hierarchy, or 
those altogether outside the purview of Islamic law, e.g. Christian jurisprudence. 
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fāghūs)—and attempted to rescue as much of the meaning of the terminology as 
possible by relying on more general Arabic terms. The resulting argument describes 
a much more generic form of decision-making about things past and future that 
seeks to establish truth or falsehood and justice or injustice of a proposition or 
action. 
The legal terminology in the Rhetoric to some degree facilitated such a 
reading because many terms either also had more general, less specifically legal 
meanings to do with decision-making and verification or could be read as such on 
the basis of cognate, more general terms (as e.g. in the case of the relatively specific 
κριτής). 
The translator’s understanding of the first chapters of Book One and indeed 
the entire Rhetoric was probably also highly influenced by its inclusion (already in 
late antiquity) in the canon of Aristotle’s logical writings, the Organon.35 It is 
supported by his reading of the very first words of Book One which link the 
discipline of rhetoric to dialectics.36 Dialectics, Arabic jadal, was also the title of the 
Arabic translation of Aristotle’s Topics, allegedly one of the earliest officially 
commissioned translations from Greek into Arabic.37 Since dialectics is a branch of 
                                                
35 On the subject of the ‘logical’ interpretation of the Rhetoric and Poetics, see 
Schoeler, ‘Averroes’ Rückwendung,’ p. 296 and D. Black, Logic and Aristotle’s Rhetoric 
and Poetics in Medieval Arabic Philosophy (Islamic Philosophy and Theology, 7), Leiden: 
Brill, 1990, esp. pp. 1-13. 
36 Ἡ ῥητορική ἐστιν ἀντίστροφος τῇ διαλεκτικῇ (1354a1), translated as inna l-
rīṭūriyya tarjiʿ ʿalā l-diyāliqṭīqiyya (Lyons, Aristotle’s Ars Rhetorica, p. 1, l. 1). 
37 Cf. D. Gutas, Greek Thought, Arabic Culture, London, 1998, pp. 61-69. 
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logic, rhetoric (its ἀντίστροφος, “counterpart”)38 also qualified as a branch of logic. 
The translator rendered ἀντίστροφος as tarjiʿ ʿalā, which can mean “derives from.” 
Apparently, the relationship he envisaged was one of dependency rather than 
opposition (which is one of the other possible meanings of ἀντίστροφος).39 The 
relationship between rhetoric and logic is spelled out in detail a little further 
down.40 There could be little doubt for the translator that the subject matter of this 
text was logic, albeit a specific and perhaps ‘lesser’ branch; in this, he followed a 
mode of interpreting the Rhetoric and the Poetics that stretches back to the late 
antique commentary tradition.41 
In sum, there is a connection between the tendency of the translator to drain 
the text of some of its legal content by ‘generalizing’ its terminology and the 
tradition of ‘logical’ readings of the Rhetoric which is such a prominent part of its 
reception in the Islamic world. There may even have been a causal link, either in the 
form of the general terminology suggesting or helping a logical reading and/or the 
                                                
38 On this key term, cf. G. Kennedy, Aristotle, On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991, p. 28, n. 2. 
39 See Aouad, Commentaire moyen, I, p. 7 on the relation between dialectic and 
rhetoric on the one hand and logic on the other according to Ibn Rushd. 
40 E.g. 1355a3-14 = Lyons, Aristotle’s Ars Rhetorica, p. 4, l. 15-5, l. 3. Rapp, Aristoteles: 
Rhetorik, II, p. 19-25 gives a detailed overview of the relevance of the ἀντίστροφος 
remark and its elaboration in the first two chapters of Book One for the 
interpretation of the relationship between rhetoric and dialectics and their 
treatment in the antique, medieval and Renaissance commentary tradition. 
41 Cf. Vagelpohl, Aristotle’s Rhetoric, pp. 52-54. 
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expectation of logical content disposing the translator towards a more general 
interpretation of the text. 
 
Ibn Rushd 
As a paraphrase, Ibn Rushd’s Middle Commentary does not replicate the 
terminology of the translation in a straightforward fashion: the author expanded 
the text, left out some parts and systematized both the terminology and the 
structure of the argument of the two chapters. As a result, his commentary seems 
much more transparent and consistent than the translation. Ibn Rushd retained 
both the three-fold distinction of ‘occasions’ or types of oratory and the term for 
the category which interests us most, legal speeches. They were called tashājur or 
mushājiriyya. 
On the whole, the legal vocabulary seems less ambiguous than that of the 
translation without, however, transposing Aristotle’s discussion into Islamic legal 
terms. As a result, the discussion remains abstract. Ibn Rushd adopted key terms of 
the translation, e.g. ḥākim, sunna/sunan and iʿtidhār, or used a different form of the 
same root (e.g. shakwā instead of shikāya). 
Instead of the term fāḥiṣ the translator used to render δικαστής, “the 
juryman” or “judge,” Ibn Rushd apparently preferred munāẓir 
(opponent/interlocutor) and tanāẓur (difference of opinion). In addition to the 
notions of discussion or debate, it also evokes the kind of disputes called munāẓara 
(dealing mostly with theological or legal issues) and also a popular literary genre of 
medieval prose in which animate and inanimate objects debate their relative 
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superiority (e.g. different varieties of flowers; vices and virtues).42 It is also 
interesting to see that the term ḥukm ([legal] decision) is replaced by the term taṣdīq 
(conviction/assent), a key technical term of logic in Islamic philosophy.43 The 
remaining terminology is a strong reminder of the judicial context of the discussion 
but in the end, the point Ibn Rushd stressed is the universality of the mechanisms 
described for generating “conviction” in a psychological rather than legal sense—
his concerns were logical, not judicial. 
Neither the translator nor Ibn Rushd made much use of the rich terminology 
of Islamic law. Both understood the legal thrust of the source text. But the 
translator was confronted with the incompatibility between native Arabic linguistic 
and Islamic legal categories and the phenomena described in the Rhetoric. 
Transposing the discussion into Islamic legal terms was close to impossible: the 
institutionalized form of oratory Aristotle described could not be understood in an 
Islamic legal context. Merely transcribing terms only made sense wherever the 
number of transcriptions remained small and informed readers were able to infer at 
least part of their meaning from the context. Thanks to its wide variety of legal 
                                                
42 Cf. Aouad, Commentaire moyen, III, pp. 9-10. 
43 For its use in various Arabic philosophical sources, see H. Wolfson, “The Terms 
Taṣawwur and Taṣdīq in Arabic Philosophy and their Greek, Latin and Hebrew 
Equivalents,” The Moslem World 33 (1943): 114-128; for a definition, cf. H. Gätje, 
“Logisch-semasiologische Theorien bei al-Ġazzālī,” Arabica 21 (1974): 151-182 (p. 
163). Black, Logic, pp. 71-78 explains the centrality of the concept of taṣdīq and its 
counterpart, taṣawwur (conception), in the context of the ‘logical’ reading of 
Aristotle’s Rhetoric and Poetics in the Arabic philosophical tradition. 
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terms, widespread transcription would have made the relevant chapters of the 
Rhetoric unreadable. The translator used it only once for Ἄρειος πάγος. His choices 
were probably ad-hoc rather than based on a conscious decision to follow a 
particular translation strategy. 
The apparent attenuation of the legal flavour of the text through its 
translation and commentary history was not as linear a process as it seems on the 
basis of the translation and Ibn Rushd’s Middle Commentary. As we have seen 
above, ḥukūma is one of the terms the translator used to render forms of δικάζω. 
This choice and the gloss on rīṭūrīqā at the beginning of the translation (al-balāgha fī 
al-ḥukūma, “eloquence in the dispensation of justice”) counteract the apparent 
tendency of the translator to downplay the legal character of the relevant portions 
of the text.44 The same formulation also re-appeared at the beginning of the chapter 
on rhetoric in Ibn Sīnā’s al-Ḥikma al-ʿarūḍīya entitled Fī maʿānī kitāb rīṭūrīqā (On the 
ideas of the Rhetoric): its full title is Fī maʿānī kitāb rīṭūrīqā ay al-balāgha fī l-ḥukūma wa-
l-khiṭāba (On the ideas of the Rhetoric, i.e. eloquence in the dispensation of justice 
and in oratory).45 The somewhat muted legal tone of the translation with its often 
ambiguous terminology was amplified well before the time Ibn Sīnā and Ibn Rushd 
commented on the text; the former at least clearly picked up on this tendency. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
                                                
44 They also illustrate the fact that the glossator was still very much aware of the 
legal relevance of the subject matter, apparently more so than the translator 
himself. 
45 Cf. Sālim, Kitāb al-Majmūʿ, p. 15, n. 1 and Aouad, Commentaire moyen, III, p. 1. 
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So far, we have looked at two examples for strategies a particular translator 
employed to deal with the class of translation problems I have subsumed under the 
label ‘translatability.’ The first one is at work in the attempt of the translator to 
clarify Aristotle’s discussion of the use of the voice in public speaking. Reproducing 
his remarks on the system of Greek pitch accents was impossible: they cannot be 
described and understood in terms of an Arabic linguistic and phonetic frame of 
reference. Hence, the translator attempted to transpose them into categories that 
fit Arabic linguistic phenomena, in this case those of Arabic song. The second 
strategy consisted of de-emphasizing the cultural and linguistic specificity of source 
language concepts and translating them with broader target language terms. To 
communicate at least a substantial part of the meaning of the text, perhaps also in 
an attempt to support a trans-cultural logical interpretation, the translator shed 
exactly those semantic details that firmly anchor a term in its culture and language 
of origin.46 
Admittedly, the amount of evidence presented so far is rather slim. However, 
I believe the cases above are representative of a wider phenomenon. 
‘Untranslatability’, in particular the translation of linguistic elements (concepts, 
                                                
46 These two strategies for translating culturally specific terms into a target 
language and culture that do not share them are a well-known phenomenon in 
translation studies. They are not the only possible methods to deal with the issue 
(others include transcription, the introduction of neologisms or outright 
description or explanation). Cf. S. Florin, “Realia in translation,” in: Translation as 
Social Action: Russian and Bulgarian Perspectives, ed. P. Zlateva, London-New York: 
Routledge, 1993, pp. 122-128 (pp. 125-126). 
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things or institutions) intimately bound up with the “universe of reference of the 
original culture,” is a universal problem. Irrespective of the source and target 
language, their relationship and degree of closeness to each other, their respective 
“universes of reference” never completely coincide. These linguistic elements can 
be circumscribed and sometimes even understood by a target language audience, 
but even under optimal circumstances, there remains a residue of meaning that 
cannot be transmitted.47 This issue becomes particularly acute whenever translators 
have to bridge vast differences in culture, space and time. Even on the basis of this 
limited set of examples, I am convinced that the products of the Greek-Arabic 
translators are ideally suited to illustrate the problem of dealing with semantic 
disparities between languages and to study the various strategies translators 
employed in dealing with them. To confirm and extend our findings, we would need 
to examine a wider range of texts.48 
The strategies of ‘accommodation’ identified above correspond well with the 
‘ethos’ of translation expressed in our handful of contemporary sources such as 
statements by translators on their methods.49 Both these and the translations 
                                                
47 Cf. André Lefevere’s introduction to Florin, Realia, pp. 122-123. 
48 Among others, Aristotle’s Poetics is probably an extremely rich source for relevant 
examples. Since the subject matter of the Poetics and the Rhetoric partially overlap 
and the texts at the same time represent different stages of the translation 
movement, a comparison between the two would be highly desirable. 
49 Pride of place belongs to the discussion of Ḥunayn b. Isḥāq in his Risāla (G. 
Bergsträsser, “Ḥunain b. Isḥāq über die syrischen und arabischen Galen-
Übersetzungen,” Abhandlungen für die Kunde des Morgenlandes 17 (1925): 1-49 with 
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themselves, at least those of the mature phase of the Greek-Arabic translation 
movement associated with Ḥunayn b. Isḥāq and his associates, suggest that 
translators privileged the sense of a text over its wording, up to and including the 
freedom to delete material that was deemed to be irrelevant or to reconstruct 
missing chunks of text in the process of restoring as complete a Greek version as 
possible before translating it into Syriac and/or Arabic.50 
                                                                                                                                       
additions in G. Bergsträsser, “Neue Materialien zu Ḥunain b. Isḥāq’s Galen-
Bibliographie,” Abhandlungen für die Kunde des Morgenlandes 19 (1932): 1-108. Cf. also 
Vagelpohl, “The ʿAbbasid Translation Movement,” pp. 248-263, for a compilation 
and discussion of other such pronouncements by translators and contemporary 
scholars. 
50 For the deletion of difficult literary quotations which, according to Ḥunayn, did 
not add to the medical discussion at hand, cf. M. Meyerhof and J. Schacht, “Galen 
über die medizinischen Namen,” Abhandlungen der preussischen Akademie der 
Wissenschaften. Philosophisch-historische Klasse 3 (1931): 32. In Bergsträsser, Ḥunain b. 
Isḥāq, no. 122, Ḥunayn explains that, after translating a particular text into Syriac, 
he filled a lacuna at the beginning before producing an Arabic version. Another 
interesting example for an attempt to reconstruct missing material is preserved in 
his translation of Galen’s commentary on Hippocrates’ Epidemics, where Ḥunayn 
filled in a Hippocratic lemma from another source and added his own commentary 
“which I thought would be similar to that of Galen in doctrine and what is 
connected with it” (aḍaftu ilay-hi min al-tafsīr mā ẓanantu anna-hu yushākilu madhhab 
Jālīnūs fī tafsīri-hi la-hu wa-mā yattaṣilu bi-hi); ms. Escurial 804, fol. 53a, l. 8f; cf. P. 
Pormann, “Case Notes and Clinicians: Galen’s Commentary on the Hippocratic 
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As with other potential pitfalls of translation, the translators and some of 
their scholarly audience shared an acute awareness of the problem of 
‘translatability’ and its potential to undermine the value and even the very 
possibility of translation: in his Kitāb al-Imtāʿ wa-l-muʾānasa (Book of Enjoyment and 
Conviviality), Abū Ḥayyān al-Tawḥīdī (d. 414/1023) recalled a debate between the 
grammarian Abū Saʿīd al-Sīrāfī (d. 368/979) and the translator and philosopher Abū 
Bishr Mattā b. Yūnus (d. 328/940) set in Baghdad in the year 331/932, in which the 
former maintains that, rather than referring to the same “universe of reference,” 
each language operates within its own semantic world and even its individual 
system of determining the truth of a statement.51 In his scathing criticism of 
contemporary translators and translation in general, al-Jāḥiẓ (d. 255/868-9) focused 
more on practical than theoretical issues, blaming the deficiencies of available 
Greek-Arabic translations on the translators’ flawed understanding of their sources 
and inadequate linguistic training. In addition, he claimed that even an ideally 
qualified translator would find it next to impossible to avoid linguistic interference 
between the source and target languages, i.e. the contamination of a target text 
with grammatical and terminological relics of the source language.52 
                                                                                                                                       
Epidemics in the Arabic Tradition,” Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 18 (2008): 247-284 
(p. 256). 
51 Al-Tawḥīdī, Kitāb al-Imtāʿ wa-l-Muʾānasa, ed. Aḥmad Amīn and Aḥmad al-Zayn, I, 
Cairo: Lajnat al-Taʾlīf wa-l-Tarjama wa-l-Nashr, 1939-1942, pp. 110, 112. 
52 Al-Jāḥiẓ, Kitāb al-Ḥayawān, ed. ʿAbd al-Salām Muḥammad Hārūn, I, Cairo: Maktabat 
al-Khānjī, 19652, pp. 76-77. 
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Given these obstacles, it is surprising how successful translators often were 
and how much of a source text they were able to communicate. They sometimes had 
to go to extraordinary lengths to achieve their goals: even early translations such as 
the Arabic Rhetoric display a translational flexibility that belies any description of 
the translation process based on schematic classifications such as ‘literal’ and 
‘free.’53 
The process of transmitting information across such vast distances in time 
and space required a degree of independence and license in the handling of the 
sources that also undermines a static notion of authorship: the resulting texts were 
a creation as much of the author of the source text as of its translator(s). The more 
we learn about the details of the Greek-Arabic translation process and the nature of 
its results, the more we have to address them as independent literary creations 
which gave rise to scientific and philosophical ideas that were sometimes only 
implicit or not at all present in the sources. 
However—and this is the main issue I wanted to raise by comparing the 
translation with Ibn Rushd’s commentary—the subsequent philosophical and 
scientific tradition continued to produce new re-readings and re-writings of the 
translations, some of which were closer to the ideas expressed in the sources than 
the translations themselves. With his experience in understanding philosophical 
translations and identifying later accretions, Ibn Rushd was able to ‘return’ to a 
reading of Aristotle’s Rhetoric that in some respects proved to be more faithful than 
the preceding commentaries and the understanding of the translator. 
                                                
53 For a more detailed criticism of these topoi of translation analysis, cf. Vagelpohl, 
Aristotle’s Rhetoric, pp. 219-221. 
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In sum, the creativity and independence of the translation process does not 
necessarily result in irreversible departures from the thought of the original author 
(however fruitful and valuable they may turn out to be), but are just the beginning 
of a process that can lead in both directions: further away from the ideas of the 
original author and also back to the ‘original.’ Ironically, in the case of Aristotle, 
most commentators insisted that it was they rather than anyone else who presented 
his thought in its ‘purest’ form. 
